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GROWTH AND STABILITY 






Economists have developed numerous theories for explaining complex 
economic phenomena and providing a basis for possible policy advice. 
The explanatory power of these theories has been empirically tested. In 
spite of their theoretical complexity by their nature these theories must 
involve simplifications of the reality they seek to explain. As a result they 
leave ample room for controversies while their empirical verification can 
lead to contradictory results because of the numerous constraints such 
test impose. 
 
The purpose of the introductory paragraph is to warn the reader that a 
certain degree of skepticism is necessary and that he must not succumb 
to the illusion that extremely complex phenomena can be simply and 
easily explained in a way which leads to unambiguous policy 
recommendations. With this in mind he should consider the analysis 
which follows. 
 
Growth and stability are certainly two phenomena which do not lack 
complexity. In spite of major advances in economic theory it remains 
unclear which factors contribute to growth and in which way they do so. 
Equally, it remains unclear what are the dominant requirements for 
achieving and maintaining stability and low inflation rates. While 
advances have been made in each of these fields (in standard growth 
theory endogenous growth theories have explicitly introduced human 
factor which together with institutional economics has somewhat 
diminished the "terra incognita" of growth analysis while rational 
expectations theories have made a seminal contribution to the 
rudimentary Keynesian tools for analyzing inflation and stabilization 
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policies) the link between growth and macroeconomic stability remains 
theoretically unclear and consequently empirically insufficiently tested. 
Together, these two features present serious limitations for any possible 
relevant economic policy conclusions. 
 
All governments seeking to increase growth rates while maintaining 
stability as well as international financial organizations trying to achieve 
growth and stability in the world economy find themselves in this 
insufficiently clear theoretical and empirical area. This led to a conviction 
which was based more on empirical than theoretical grounds. It claimed 
that the necessary preconditions for stable sustainable growth are 
macroeconomic stability and an overall system of efficiently functioning 
markets. As a result, all levels of economic policy gave special attention 
to macroeconomic stabilization and restructuring policies which 
attempted to influence the key growth factors, i.e. savings, investment in 
physical and human capital, capital productivity and technological 
development. 
 
The remainder of this paper, without seeking to provide an all 
encompassing analysis, will attempt to present some recent results of 
empirical research of the growth-stability nexus and then concentrate 
only on those aspects which seem especially relevant for Croatia. By 
using a simple analytical model the following links will be discussed: (i) 
domestic savings, foreign capital inflows and the real exchange rate, (ii) 
the above links together with macroeconomic policies, the internal and 
external equilibrium and growth in Croatia in recent years and finally (iii) 
the links between capital inflows, the exchange rate, internal and 
external equilibrium and stabilization policies in conditions of money 
substitution in Croatia. 
 
The analysis will show that following Croatia's independence and war the 
changing relationship between domestic savings and investment on the 
one hand and imports and exports on the other resulted in changes in 
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the real equilibrium exchange rate. The analytical results are 
supplemented by national account estimates. 
 
Furthermore the paper will show that after a credible reduction in 
inflation rates there was an inflow of capital. This foreign capital was 
largely a result of inverse money substitution, i.e. capital repatriation and 
depletion of "mattress" reserves. Until the second half of 1994 this inflow 
was driven by rising demand for money, this in turn influenced exchange 
rate appreciation but did not have repercussions for the current account. 
In the second part of 1994 and during 1995 the economy experienced 
increased consumption which resulted in a current account deficit and 
further pressures for currency appreciation. 
 
The main economic policy implication of this analysis can be summed up 
in the claim that growth requires increasing net domestic savings. Such a 
change would allow investments to rise along with exchange rate 
depreciation and increased exports. Without this precondition and in the 
environment of continued currency substitution any attempt to 
depreciate the currency in real terms by forcing a nominal depreciation 
would result in economic policy loosing its credibility with consequences 
being an increase in inflationary expectations, a rise of inflation and a 
decrease of economic activity with unsustainable balance of payments 
position with a new wave of capital flight. 
 
GROWTH AND INFLATION: THE EXPERIENCE 
 
Most empirical work linking growth with macroeconomic and structural 
variables is based on partial theories and an ad hoc choice of 
explanatory variables which themselves are not soundly embedded in 
economic theory. Consequently the results vary and offer themselves to 
different interpretations. But as Kahn and Villanueva (1991) stress even 
using reduced forms of completely specified growth models could not 
completely avoid simultaneity problems. This is because some of the 
exogenous economic and political variables could be considered 
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endogenous and defined as government reactions to certain 
macroeconomic events which could include changes in the growth rate. 
The authors illustrated this claim in a survey of recent empirical results 
dealing with the effects of economic policy on growth. Of the ten 
macroeconomic variables included fiscal policy variables show the 
greatest variability and hence ambiguity. On the other hand, exports and 
real interest rates (which can be considered as partially reflecting 
inflationary influences in reverse) have an unambiguous positive 
influence on growth. 
 
Furthermore, empirical results do not unambiguously support the widely 
held opinion that mild inflation and growth are positively correlated in 
the short term cyclical change and negatively correlated in the long 
term. Data from the fifties and sixties seem to support the claim of a 
positive short term relationship which led to the famed Phillips curve. 
Data from the seventies and eighties do not empirically support this 
claim but the modified Friedman-Phelps version of the Phillips curve 
according to which cyclical unemployment can fall below the natural rate 
only if realized inflation rates are higher than expected ones. 
 
But it was left to the recent work of Bruno and Easterly (1994) to 
provide a more robust negative link of growth and inflation. While the 
negative link is unambiguous for high inflation rates it remains 
empirically ambiguous for low inflation rates. The article notes an even 
more important empirical result for Croatia. They found that a successful 
reduction of high inflation rates is followed with strong economic 
recovery within a six year period, i.e. if sufficient time is allowed for the 
completion of economic adjustment. The following scenario emerges 
from this result: after first falling and then negative growth rates caused 
by high inflation rates an inflationary crises emerges (the threshold of 
the inflationary crises has been estimated at 40% at annual level) which 
is followed by successful stabilization leading to recovering growth rates 
which are eventually higher than those from before the crises. 
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The study does not explain the mechanism on which this empirical 
process is based and most of the proof remains in the domain of the 
anecdotal. It was also noted that after the crises fiscal policy is much 
more conservative and that either an independent central bank emerges 
or the independence of an existing central bank increases. Furthermore, 
after stabilization the link between the budget and monetary policy was 
often broken or limited while increased trade liberalization led to 
increased productivity and competitiveness which in turn acted to 
prevent the return of inflation. Financial sector rehabilitation and 
recovery have also been noted as possible channels of growth recovery. 
The possible effects of a break down of interest groups and lobbies 
during the crises is also stressed as well as the positive effects this can 
have on the improved functioning of markets and growth recovery in the 
post-crises period. Another interesting result of the study is that 
investment recovery is, as a rule, slower than growth recovery. This in 
turn seems to support a recent hypothesis that investments follow 
growth and not vice versa. 
 
A careful observer of Croatia cannot omit noticing that all the cited 
economic policy changes enabling growth recovery after successful price 
stabilization are present in Croatia. Thus some important but not, as will 
be later shown, all the preconditions are present. Hence it is up to 
credible and prudent economic policy to use the opportunity provided. 
But as the authors of the cited paper note in their conclusion this is only 
partially a matter of expertise but of political economy to explain why in 
spite of the clearly determined favorable effects on growth stabilization 
policies are frequently postponed. 
 
THE CASE OF CROATIA 
 
This section discusses the link between macroeconomic equilibrium and 
growth in the Croatian context. Dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium is 
defined as a state in which growth is consistent with low and stable 
inflation rates and a sustainable balance of payments. This definition is 
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derived from the hypothesis that while growth is perhaps linked to high 
inflation and balance of payments deficit in the short run in the medium 
and long term high inflation and rising foreign indebtedness are 
negatively linked to growth. 
 
In absence of a general growth model which would integrate growth and 
macroeconomic equilibrium the paper's analysis of macroeconomic 
equilibrium will rely on the model of a small open economy with growth 
introduced in informal terms. Special attention will be given to savings, 
investments, balance of payments and the real exchange rate, variables 
which according to growth theory are the main determinants of long 
term growth. 
 
This framework will be used to analyze why after independence and war 
Croatia experienced real exchange rate appreciation and what economic 
policy can and should do to enable growth in a stable economic 
environment, i.e. growth with internal and external equilibrium. It should 
be noted, however, that external equilibrium does not imply a balanced 
balance of payments but sustainable and consistent to the current phase 
of development. 
 
The approach can be depicted in a graph with curves showing internal 
and external equilibrium. The intersection of the curves determines the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. An informal analysis will, however, be 
used to determine whether this exchange rate is consistent with dynamic 
equilibrium, i.e. whether it supports sustainable growth. 
 
The horizontal axes shows net exports (representing of the state of the 
current account balance) and vertical one the real exchange rate. The 
curve is negatively sloped because a lower real exchange rate implies 
higher net exports. Since savings are not functionally related to the 
exchange rate the S-I curve depicting net savings is shown as a vertical 
line (i.e. a line parallel to the axes showing the exchange rate). As a 
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consequence the real exchange rate is determined by the relationship of 




Which events in Croatia after 1992 influenced shifts in the curves 
depicting internal and external equilibrium? If we assume that till 1992 
the real exchange rate equilibrium was at e' where the NX' (net exports) 
and S-I' (net domestic savings) curves intersect then the economy was 
facing positive net exports, i.e. a surplus in the current account which 
equaled the surplus of domestic savings over investments. Data provided 
in the table indicate that such circumstances did in fact prevail. The 
dotted S-I is drawn to describe circumstances in which NX=S-I=O (it 
must be noted that the balance of payments surplus till 1992, more 
precisely till 1990 because until that year reliable data exists, includes 







The data clearly show that up to 1992 (more precisely 1990) there were 
two substantially different subperiods. During the 1986-1988 subperiod 
net domestic savings were positive, on average 6.7% of GDP, and their 
value equalled the net exports of goods and services (Because of 
difficulties distinguishing the populations current and capital transaction 
factor incomes and transfers are treated as capital account transactions. 
As a result savings are domestic savings and not national savings while 
net exports equal the so called resource balance and not current 
balance.) Due to falling production and high inflation rates during 1989 
and 1990 there was a significant decrease of savings and a somewhat 
smaller decrease of investments. As a result net savings and net export 
fell to only about 0.4% of GDP. This is shown on the graph by the 
leftward shift of the I-S curve which in turn increased the real 
equilibrium rate from e' to e". 
 
From 1992 onwards, more precisely from the second half of 1991, the 
loss of the Yugoslav market and war caused a fall of production, savings 
and investment. War related risks had a negative influence on exports 
which was partially neutralized by trade redirection from the former 
Yugoslav market. Imports fell due to decreasing production and 
investments. 
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In addition to the above, with independence Croatia found itself in quite 
different structural circumstances. In former Yugoslavia Croatia through 
its current account surplus provided foreign currency for the whole 
economy. As a result with independence there was a major increase in 
the real exchange rate value which kept the external balance in 
equilibrium. 
 
This, together with falling imports caused by economic contraction, 
shifted the external equilibrium curve to the right. The rightward shift 
implies that under the new circumstances with unchanged domestic net 
savings only a higher exchange rate could maintain the existing 
equilibrium of imports and exports. Since savings contracted faster than 
investments net domestic savings became negative shifting the S-I curve 
to the left and beyond the S-I=NX=O, i.e. net exports also became 
negative and equaled between 1 and 1.5% of GDP. 
 
The new equilibrium exchange rate e"' is determined by the intersection 
of the NX" and S-I"' curves and it is significantly higher than the e' 
equilibrium exchange rate which prevailed during the eighties. Such 
circumstances lasted till the end of 1994. The remainder of the section 
will discuss the changes which occurred in 1995. Before addressing this 
issue it is necessary to answer the question whether the exchange rate 
prevailing in 1994 was a long run dynamic equilibrium exchange rate? 
 
The long term equilibrium exchange rate is defined as that exchange 
rate which, given its long term determinants, results in simultaneous 
achievement of external and internal equilibrium in dynamic context. The 
answer to the posed question depends on whether the current exchange 
rate satisfies the definition. 
 
In other words it depends whether the current exchange rate maintains 
low and stable inflation rates with unemployment close to its natural 
level, whether it is appropriate for the current phase of the cycle in such 
a way that the present discounted value of current and future surpluses 
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and deficits is zero and, finally, whether it maintains such a growth rate 
which maximizes per capita income in the long term. 
 
It must be immediately noted that without a precise model linking the 
relevant variables a precise answer is not possible. What can be done is 
to analyze which of the key factors are not in accord with a dynamic long 
term equilibrium. 
 
The analysis will disregard some important factors which influence the 
equilibrium exchange rate, e.g. the terms of trade, technology, capital 
flows, productivity changes and the efficient functioning of markets. This 
will be done because these factors are to a large extent exogenous and 
difficult to observe or measure and to keep the analyses manageable. 
The analyses will thus concentrate on the fundamentals which are 
observable and/or constitute economic political variables or are under 
their direct influence. The variables in question are: savings, investment, 
public consumption, protection levels and exports. These variables are 
fundamental both for determining macroeconomic equilibrium and 
growth. 
 
Which set of values of the variables are suitable for a small market 
economy maximizing living standards in the long run? Growth theory 
tells us that savings and investment into physical and human capital 
must be as large as possible, that the level of protection must be as low 
as possible and that public consumption must be as small as possible so 
as not to crowd out investments and exports and that exports must grow 
dynamically. 
 
Furthermore, to satisfy the intertemporal balance of payments constraint 
the growth phase exhibiting an increased debt and foreign direct 
investment must be followed by a growth phase with a current account 
surplus which will enable unhindered debt servicing. With this in mind 
the growth rate must be at least equal to the world market real interest 
rate (i.e. in the medium term at least 5-6% and converging to a long 
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term growth rate of 2-3% which equals world market long term interest 
rates). 
 
What were the values of variables in Croatia during 1994 when 
compared to their values in economies of similar size and level of 
development? In relation to pre-war levels the rate of savings has been 
halved to 13-14% of GDP. The share of gross fixed investments is a little 
larger, around 15% of GDP. This makes net savings negative. This in 
turn leads to a negative external balance equaling around 1 % of GDP. 
Obviously, increasing growth rates in the medium term requires a 
significant increase of the share of investments to 2025% of GDP. Given 
the need to maintain external equilibrium within sustainable limits this 
implies the need for a significant increase of domestic savings. In other 
words, during the period in which it is increasing the external deficit on 
average should not in the medium term exceed 5% of GDP. Possible 
larger shares could be acceptable only on account of direct investments. 
 
Identities (1) and (2) represent equilibrium conditions for the real sector 
of an open economy. From these it follows that increasing public 
consumption directly reduces savings and that a public sector deficit 
reduces savings further. The latter is clearly visible from equation (3) 
which is an expansion of equation (2). 
 




Y = GDP, C = personal consumption, G = public consumption, 
I=investments, NX=net exports or balance of goods and non-factor 
services, p and g refer to private and public sector 
 
Given the need to increase domestic savings the 28% share of public 
consumption in GDP is too large. An alleviating condition is found in the 
fact that public sector was balanced during 1994 and so did not further 
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reduce savings through a deficit. It follows that public consumption 
should be decreased and that creating a deficit should be avoided. 
Perhaps even a small surplus should be created, this would make room 
for a larger increase in private investment without excessively increasing 
the external deficit. 
 
Furthermore and along with the endogenous growth theory the share of 
expenditures for education, health, science and technology, as 
investments in human capital, should be increased at the expense of 
defense expenditures. Empirical research, see Knight, Loazya and 
Villuaneva (1995), show the latter to have a clear negative impact on 
long term growth. 
 
A further liberalization of the trade regime, i.e. lowering protection and 
opening up to the world economy, provide further stimuli to export 
growth by influence on equilibrum exchange rate depreciation and all the 
known advantages which increasing international trade has for the 
growth and stability of a small economy. 
 
The implementation of such a scenario leads to high and stable growth 
under one precondition: that low and stable inflation rates prevail. 
 
How would the mentioned favorable changes be reflected in the real 
exchange rate and would the long term equilibrium real exchange rate 
which is consistent with the above scenario be different from the current 
one? The graph provides a framework for analyzing the influence of the 
favorable changes. 
 
The influence a further liberalization of the foreign trade regime would 
shift the NX curve further to the left. This would, ceteris paribus, lead to 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate and thus provide an incentive 
for increasing exports. 
 
 39
Whether the S-I curve will shift and by how much depends on changes 
in savings and investment during the phases of the growth cycle. If 
economic policy would reduce the share of consumption in GDP the 
consequent rise of savings would shift the curve right and lead to a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. But with the rise of investments 
the final outcome would depend on the relative dynamics of the two. 
The assumption that during the first phase the share of investments in 
GDP would rise faster than the share of savings would lead to a rising 
negative share of net saving, albeit at higher absolute levels, which 
would shift the S-I curve left and lead to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate. In later stages and for higher income levels the share of 
savings would increase, this would gradually shift the I-S curve right. 
The S-I curve could approach the dotted S-I curve from either side, 
depending on the relationship of the other mentioned factors and on 
those whose influence has been omitted in the analysis. 
 
The described shifts of the curves would result with the equilibrium 
exchange rate moving in the range defined by el and ell. During the first 
phase it would move in the direction of el and during the second in the 
direction of ell. It is clear then that there is no fixed long term 
equilibrium exchange rate, see Edwards (1988), and that the current one 
is located on the path on which the long term equilibrium exchange rate 
is located. 
 
The analysis, however, points out another thing: the current real 
exchange rate is determined by values of fundamentals which are not in 
line with high long term growth rates. However it must also be noted 
that the exchange rate is an endogenous variable. Thus efforts to 
change nominal rates without changing the fundamentals would only 
result in macroeconomic disequilibrium and a negative influence on 
determinants of long term economic growth. The same is true of interest 
rates because the exchange rate and the interest rate are more or less 
directly linked by their determinants. 
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The analysis leads to the conclusion that economic policy should 
concentrate on changing the variables along lines consistent with 
dynamic stable long term growth while at the same time maintaining low 
and stable inflation rates. Economic policy must thus rely on 
macroeconomic, structural and institutional building policies to provide a 
stable but flexible business environment which will enable the efficient 
implementation of policy incentives aimed at increasing savings, 
investments and strengthening competitiveness in order to achieve the 
maximum rate of integration into the world economy. 
 
Describing the required policies and mechanisms, even providing their 
rough outline is outside the scope of this paper. It must, however, be 
stressed that in this process the role of the state is to provide a 
favorable environment for changes but that the leading role must be left 
to the markets, i.e. private entrepreneurs. 
 
The final part of this paper will attempt to deal with economic 
developments during 1995. They will be described within the already 
introduced analytical framework which will be somewhat expanded. The 
expansion relates to the introduction of the capital account, the 
monetary sector together with its specifics, i.e. by introducing the 
influence of money substitution which is present in the Croatian 
economy. With this in mind equation (3) will be expanded as follows: 
 





FI=foreign direct investment, NFA=net foreign assets of the monetary 
and non monetary sector, M=broadly defined money, MD=domestic 
money including foreign exchange deposits in domestic banks, 
DC=domestic credits, FC=residents' holdings of foreign currency, 
FDA=residents' deposits in foreign banking sector, FLB=foreign liabilities 
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of monetary sector, FLP=foreign liabilities of non-monetary sector; other 
symbols were defined previously. 
 
From equation (4) it follows that net domestic saving in the private and 
public sector equal the external balance (the sum of current and capital 
account balances) which equals change in net foreign assets which is in 
turn equal to changes in broadly defined money and credits. This shows 
the links between the real and monetary sector in an open economy. 
 
The money substitution is reflected in equation (6). The equation shows 
that the quantity of money is defined both by domestic money (MD) and 
foreign currency held in the country by the private sector (FC) and 
deposits by residents held in foreign banks (FDA). It is also reflected in a 
part of domestic money held by residents as foreign currency deposits in 
domestic banks. Due to this definition the net foreign assets must 
include both the assets of the domestic monetary system and assets and 
liabilities of the domestic non-monetary sector (i.e. citizens and firms). 
 
Money substitution has numerous implications for economic policy and 
economic changes in the country. There is a voluminous literature on the 
subject. This paper will limit itself to use the described expansion of 
analytical framework in attempt to explain events in Croatia during 1995 
with reference to the main topic discussed. 
 
What did in fact happen? Following a successful reduction of inflation 
rates in late 1993 there was a change in relationship of the demand for 
domestic money and foreign currency in the non-banking sector. The 
change resulted from changes in the risk-adjusted rates of return on 
foreign and domestic assets. Consequently during remonetization of the 
economy there was inverse money substitution, i.e. part of foreign non-
monetary sector assets were converted into domestic assets (this was 
primarily true for the part with transactions function, i.e. part of FC). 
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The inflow of foreign capital (which had the form of a reduction of 
foreign currency in circulation, FC and depleting and converting deposits 
held in foreign banks, FDA) did not have a major impact on the current 
account. This is because the process of changing the structure of 
financial assets of the non-monetary sector took place during most of 
1994 when there was an increase in the demand for money. So the 
reduction of these components was paralleled with an increase in foreign 
assets of the monetary sector, FAB. The central bank intervened to 
reduce the pressure this process has on currency appreciation, both 
nominal and real (the latter due to stable prices). The resulted growth of 
domestic money supply was accompanied by increased demand. 
 
During the first half of 1994 net domestic savings did not significantly 
change when compared to 1993. The increase of savings was followed 
with increased investments and the real exchange rate did not change 
significantly. As a result the two curves used in the graph did not shift. 
 
Substantial changes developed during the second half of 1994 and 
especially by the end of the year. At the time wages and tax revenue 
started increasing and as a consequence public and private consumption 
increased. The private sector financed its increased consumption partly 
by depleting foreign assets (i.e. by running down their foreign currency 
savings in foreign banks) and partly by taking loans abroad (with much 
lower interest rates than those prevailing in the country). Some of the 
foreign currency returned into the banking system which enabled banks 
to grant loans at high interest rates which made the business very 
profitable. It was in part possible because in the post-hyperinflationary 
period there usually is an extremely great demand for loans. 
 
High consumption rates fueled by wages, public revenue and the 
increasing credits under conditions of saturated domestic money demand 
continued into 1995. As a result domestic savings continued falling 
substantially. With the continued rise of private sector investment this 
led to a drastic reduction of net savings. The reduction was 
 43
counterbalanced by a big increase of the deficit in the goods and 
services balance which directly neutralized the large capital inflow. This 
reduced the pressure on the central bank so that it could sterilize the 
monetary effects of its relatively small increase in foreign assets thus 
decreasing the effects of money multiplication. At the same time a 
significant part of the new foreign exchange deposits with domestic 
banks had to be re-deposited abroad. This requirement provided a major 
limit on the short term negative effects which the change of locational 
composition of private sector foreign assets had on the balance of 
payments and exchange rate. 
 
Stated succinctly macroeconomic equilibrium is maintained in a way by 
which the increased domestic disequilibrium is closed by increasing the 
external disequilibrium. The latter is financed by a fall of net foreign 
assets of the non-monetary sector and, in spite of the small increase of 
foreign assets of the monetary sector, by a fall of the net foreign assets 
of the whole economy. 
 
In terms of the graph the described changes can be depicted as a large 
leftward shift of the S-I curve and a consequent further rise of the real 
exchange rate. This, however, did not happen so one could conclude 
that the real exchange rate is undervalued. Events justify asking why 
during 1995 there was no major appreciation of the real exchange rate? 
A possible answer is an assumed leftward shift of the NX. This shift 
would have resulted from further imports liberalization, falling 
productivity or due to changes of other fundamentals which influence 
the supply and demand of foreign currency. Regarding such changes 
there is no information. 
 
Another approach would redefine the question. Since foreign and 
domestic prices changed at similar rates the previous question can be 
restated by asking why nominal exchange rates did not change? It must 
be noted that short term macroeconomic policy measures influence the 
real rate via the nominal rate. Similar causality operates for other 
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transitory variables and market imperfections. They can all cause the 
nominal and thereby the real rate to depart from equilibrium values in 
the short term. Part of the answer is in that. 
 
But perhaps part of the answer to the question could be that the 
problem does not in fact exist! Perhaps the real exchange rate did in fact 
appreciate in spite that nominal rate remaining more or less unchanged. 
Under such circumstances the only way the real rate can appreciate is if 
domestic prices increase faster than foreign ones. It has already been 
stated earlier that domestic and foreign prices changed at similar rates. 
This conclusion was based on comparing retail and producer prices. But 
are these the only relevant prices? 
 
For the Croatian economy changes of the wage rate are also important. 
Its importance is a result of labor being the productive factor with the 
highest share in exports. In addition to wages calculations of the real 
exchange rate could also use data on relative prices of tradables and 
nontradables. If this is done for Croatian data then it becomes clear that 
wages in Croatia increased by significantly higher rates than in its main 
trading partners. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the different 
rates of changes in the prices of tradables and nontradables. Therefore if 
these prices are included the calculation would indicate that the real 
exchange rate appreciated, just as the model predicts they would. 
 
This raises a very interesting further question: why wasn't the wage 
increase completely passed over into price increases? The answer to that 
question and its implications will be dealt with on some other occasion. 
 
The present analysis of economic events in 1995 will continue by 
addressing the central theme of this paper, i.e. the relationship of 
stability and growth. In this context the issue of rising investments does 
not cause difficulties. This cannot be said of decreasing savings resulting 
from expanding private and, especially important, public consumption. 
Both rates of change were way above GDP growth. A major portion of 
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the private sector negative net saving rate is covered by debts incurred 
abroad. This in itself is not unfavorable because a large part of it ended 
up as investment. Furthermore the private sector is reacting with a 
sound sense of business because by incurring a foreign debt it is 
avoiding paying prohibitively high domestic interest rates. In this way it 
is maintaining its competitiveness and avoiding contributing either to 
high financial sector profits or to covering its losses. It prefers leaving 
that to the state. Part of the deficit financed by depleting foreign assets 
can in a subsequent period result with attempts to build them up. Such 
changes would resulting with reduced consumption, favorable changes in 
the external balance and hence a depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
These developments can be considered as normal intertemporal 
substitution of consumption through borrowing and lending. 
 
The problem is in that part of the debt resulting from a public sector 
deficit. There are indications that the public sector is increasing its 
consumption partly on account of not paying the private sector for goods 
and services consumed. Therefore the public sector deficit represents 
the significant part of counter balance to the external deficit. The public 
sector is reducing net savings both by increasing relative share of its 
current consumption and through a rising deficit. This brings it into 
conflict with both the growth target and the stability target. 
 
It is difficult to assume that the private sector will continue the forced 
and high risk financing of the public sector. Here major economic policy 
correction are necessary in order to prevent both investments and 
exports, through pressures on currency appreciation, being crowded out 
so endangering economic growth. These policies would circumvent the 
need for inflationary financing once the private sector financing of the 
deficit is exhausted. Reverting to inflationary financing would endanger 
stability and thereby even further endanger growth. With such 
constellation of fundamentals influencing the real exchange rate we 
leave it to those arguing in favor of a forced nominal depreciation of the 
exchange rate to imagine the results their policy advice would have on 
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the economy in which about half the domestic liquidity is in foreign 
exchange deposits and at least as much is in circulation and deposits in 
foreign banks. It is certain that such a forced depreciation would cause 
major losses in part of the private sector and that renewed inflationary 
expectations and inflation would lead the economy back to a state in 
which it was before the October 1993 stabilization program. In fact it 
would drive it even further back because it is much more difficult and 
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